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 Abstract. This paper studies the interaction between two 
autonomous policymakers, the central bank and the government, 
in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the 
first stage the institutional regime is established. This determines 
the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage, in 
which a differential game is played between the two 
policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can 
communicate before the game is played, (multiple-equilibrium) 
coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of 
correlated equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, which only 
allows for individualistic and independent behaviour, a 
correlated equilibrium allows for the players’ behaviour to be 
coordinated and correlated.  
Keywords: monetary and fiscal policies, differential games, 
correlated equilibrium.  
JEL codes: C73, E58, F33, and F42.  
Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination and Debt 
Management: A Two-Stage Dynamic Analysis 




In the last two decades the issue of central bank independence has been 
extensively analyzed in the literature. In many countries monetary policy is 
not directly controlled by the government and a certain degree of 
independence is granted to the central bank. Having an independent central 
bank has been interpreted as a solution to the lack of credibility of the 
government’s anti-inflationary policies. The idea is that an independent 
central bank would be mainly concerned with monetary stability.
1 
The independence of the central bank implies that economic policy making 
can be analyzed as the interaction of two autonomous decision makers with 
(partially) conflicting objectives. Game theoretic analyses of the interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policies have now become common in the 
literature.
2 In this context, institutions can be seen as the rules of the game 
played by the central bank and the government.
3 
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1 A number of empirical studies support the proposition that central bank independence and 
low rates of inflation are correlated (see for example Berger et al., 2001). However, it has 
been argued (see, e.g., Hayo and Hefeker, 2002) that this correlation does not indicate 
causality and that the reasons why central banks are made independent are related to legal, 
cultural, political, and economic factors. 
2 Seminal studies are those of Sargent and Wallace (1981), Tabellini (1986), Alesina and 
Tabellini (1987) and Turnovsky et al. (1988). More recent contributions are, among others, 
Levine and Brociner (1994), Neck and Dockner (1995). Particular emphasis has been 
recently placed on the problem of macroeconomic policy coordination in a monetary union 
(see, e.g., Cooper and Kempf 2000, Beetsma et al. 2001, Buti et al. 2001, Beetsma and  
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The equilibrium of the game can thus be found under different institutional 
arrangements, i.e. under different assumptions about the timing of play, the 
information that each policymaker has when it is its turn to choose and the 
possibility of cooperation between the policymakers. 
In this paper the institutional set-up is decided by the two policymakers 
before the game is played. Institutional design is thus interpreted as the 
policymakers’ acts that determine the rules of the game (cf. Ecchia and 
Mariotti, 1997). Accordingly, we describe institution design as the first 
stage of a two-stage game.
4 
Attention is focused on four possible institutional arrangements (i.e. policy 
regimes). In the first regime the two policymakers act simultaneously 
(Nash). In the second the monetary authority is given first-mover advantage 
(monetary leadership). In the third the central bank responds to the budget 
decisions of the fiscal authority and it is committed to meeting the financial 
needs of the government (fiscal leadership). The last regime considered is 
one in which both authorities try to lead the game (warfare). We consider 
the four regimes as possible outcomes of a first stage in which each 
policymaker has two feasible strategies: be the leader or follow the leader. 
If both authorities act as followers, the solution to be applied in the second 
stage is a Nash equilibrium in which players take their decisions 
simultaneously, i.e. without knowing the reaction of the opponent. If one 
authority acts as leader while the other acts as follower, the solution is a 
leadership equilibrium in which the leader, in computing its optimal policy, 
takes the opponent’s reaction into account. If both authorities act as leaders, 
the solution is the so-called “(Stackelberg) warfare.”
5 Which solution is the 
most appropriate description of monetary-fiscal interaction is an open 
                                                                                                                                                    
Jensen 2004, van Aarle et al. 2002, 2004, Engwerda  et al. 2002, and Dixit and Lambertini 
2003). 
3 See North (1990) for a discussion of institutions as rules of the game. 
4 Two-stage games have been recently used in order to establish the institutional 
arrangements (first stage) separately from the “main” game that in such arrangements is 
played (second stage). An example is provided by non-cooperative endogenous coalition 
theory: in the first stage coalitions are formed, whereas in the second stage coalitions play 
the game (Ray and Vohra 1999). van Aarle et al. (2002) provide an economic application of 
this approach to the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies in the EMU. 
5 On the interpretation of the warfare equilibrium there is an extensive debate, its 
description is outside the scope of this paper (see, among the others, d’Aspremont and 
Gérard-Varet 1980; Dowrick 1986; Hamilton and Slutsky 1990).  
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question. A leadership game seems a reasonable assumption because of 
differences in the decision and implementation processes of the two 
policies. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) argue that fiscal authorities have a 
first-mover advantage because fiscal policy cannot be adjusted as quickly as 
monetary policy. In other words, the rigidity in the decision process of fiscal 
policy is similar to a commitment technology. Although fiscal and monetary 
policies certainly have different timings, the assumption of fiscal leadership 
remains a pure conjecture. If one interprets leadership as deriving from the 
ability to pre-commit, then monetary leadership is an equally plausible 
scenario.
6  
We argue that the appropriate solution concept for the first stage (when 
institutions, i.e. the rules for the second stage, are established) is not Nash 
equilibrium, which only allows for individualistic and independent 
behaviour, but rather correlated equilibrium which allows for the players’ 
behaviour to be coordinated and correlated.
7 
The easiest way to think of a correlated equilibrium is to imagine that there 
is an external referee who suggests to each player which action he should 
take. If the players follow the suggestion, then the result is a correlated 
strategy. Aumann (1987) justifies the notion of correlated equilibrium as a 
result of Bayesian rationality. However, correlated equilibrium has also 
been justified as the equilibrium outcome in non-cooperative games with 
pre-play communication (Forges 1990, Lehrer 1996, Ben Porath 1998, 
Moreno and Wooders 1998) and as the limit distribution in learning models 
(Foster and Vohra 1997, and Hart and Mas-Colell 2000 and 2001). In the 
context of monetary-fiscal interactions the correlated device can be thought 
of as being a formal or informal agreement that tells the policymakers in 
which circumstances each of them, if any, is going to impose discipline on 
the other. One way to interpret this agreement is as the result of pre-play 
communication. Another (dynamic) interpretation, along the lines of the 
learning literature, would be to say that different institutions emerge as time 
passes. Alternatively, we can think of the correlated device as the 
observation of the shocks which hit the economy. 
                                                           
6 See discussion in Debrun (2000) and Dixit and Lambertini (2000). 
7 A formal definition of correlated equilibrium is given in section 5. The references for 
correlated equilibrium are Aumann (1974 and 1987).  
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The outcome of the first stage determines the institutional arrangement, i.e. 
the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage. In this stage a 
differential game is played between the central bank and the government. At 
this stage monetary and fiscal policies are set by different authorities; 
however, their decisions are subject to the government’s (dynamic) budget 
constraint. If public debt enters both policymakers’ loss function then the 
central bank would like to see the burden of reducing the debt borne mainly 
by the government and at the same time the government would like the 
central bank to accommodate its financial needs.  
The literature has mainly focused on the effects of monetary-fiscal 
interactions on short-run stabilisation of output and inflation. In these 
models, explicit consideration of the government’s budget constraint is 
usually not introduced because it generates structural dynamics which 
makes the analysis much more complicated.
8 
In this paper, attention is focused on monetary-fiscal interactions stemming 
from their effects on public debt. We follow Tabellini (1986) and apply a 
two-step procedure which, by separating the effects of monetary-fiscal 
interactions on public debt from those on output and inflation, greatly 
simplifies the dynamics of the model.
9 The first step of the procedure 
consists of computing the optimal policies in the absence of public debt. 
These unconstrained strategies have to be modified to take into account the 
effects on public debt dynamics. The adoption of this procedure allows us to 
write down a model in which the policymakers’ loss functions are directly 
defined on the policy instruments and on the state variable (public debt). 
Since our concern is not with the transitory effects of fiscal and monetary 
impulses, but rather with the permanent effects of money growth and deficit 
levels, we take a long run perspective and compute the steady state solution 
of the differential game. Transition properties of these kind of model have 
been already studied in details (see, e.g., Tabellini 1986; and van Aarle et 
al., 1997).  
                                                           
8 In fact, it requires that the feedback effects of each policymaker’s choice on future policy 
choices of the opponent be considered.  
9 See also van Aarle et al. (1997). In their analysis of the dynamic interaction of monetary 
and fiscal authority in determining debt accumulation, which is in spirit very similar to 
ours, the authors use our same approach. As they recognise, the main advantage of the two-
step procedure lies in its practicability, notwithstanding its limits.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The model is described in the 
next section and, in the appendix, it is shown how to derive the 
policymakers’ loss functions using, as an example, the well-known (micro-
founded) model developed by Dixit and Lambertini (2003).
10 In section 3 
the second stage of the game is solved for the different institutional 
arrangements. In section 4 the outcomes of the different regimes are 
compared. In section 5 the choice of the institutional arrangement is 
considered (i.e. the first stage is solved). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy in which the central bank sets monetary policy 
and the government sets fiscal policy.
11 Since this paper is not concerned 
with the issue of time inconsistency, it is assumed that there exists a 
mechanism to enforce the announced policies.
12  
The government takes decisions about public expenditure and about the tax 
structure. The amount by which public expenditure exceeds tax revenues 
determines fiscal deficit (net of interest payments). The deficit is financed 
by issuing either interest bearing bonds or money. 
The decision about the way in which public debt has to be financed is under 
the control of the central bank, which exercises this control through open 
market operations. 
Each policymaker chooses its policy by minimising an explicit loss function 
under the constraints of the economic environment. In what follows we 
focus on the policymakers’ loss functions directly defined on their control 
variables and on public debt. The other final objectives of monetary and 
fiscal policy, which concern short-run stabilization, are implicit in the 
desired values of the policymakers’ control variables. These values depend, 
                                                           
10 We believe that our results are more general than it may appear looking at the model 
developed in the appendix and that they are relevant for any situation in which two 
policymakers share a common goal and each policymaker, in trying to reach its other 
objective, has a negative impact on the common goal. 
11 The private sector consists of small agents. They do not act strategically, and therefore, 
their joint decisions on consumption and savings affect only the parameters of the model. 
12 It can be a legislative device or an external authority which prevents the players from 
reneging on the announcements made; a reputation mechanism, so that the player who 
deviates will not be believed in the future; an institution which enhance players credibility.  
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among other things, on the underlying structure of the economy and should 
vary with the information structure (which in our context is identified by the 
policy regime). In order to simplify our analysis and focus on the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions on public debt, we assume the 
unconstrained optimal strategies, i.e. those that would be chosen if public 
debt were not considered and monetary and fiscal policies only concern was 
short-run stabilisation, not to vary across policy regimes. This would for 
example be the case if there were complete separation of tasks between 
monetary and fiscal authorities and if a single target were assigned to each 
of them. 
We show how to derive the optimal unconstraint policies in the appendix 
using, as an example, Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003) model but assuming 
that, in the short run, the central bank only aims at stabilising inflation while 
the fiscal authority’s only concern is to stabilise output.
 This assumption 
should be thought of as reflecting a policy assignment in which the central 
bank mandate is to stabilize inflation so that the monetary authority is not 
supposed to trade-off inflation against output and, because of the central 
bank mandate, the government is not concerned with price stability. 
A complete micro-economic and micro-political foundation of the 
policymakers’ objectives is beyond the scope of this paper. What we have in 
mind is a situation in which institutions must receive political support and 
policy assignments reflect the interest of different groups in society. Thus, 
for example, a monetary policy devoted to price stability would be the result 
of the political power of interest groups averse to inflation (e.g. Miller, 
1998; Harrendorf and Neumann, 2003; and Di Gioacchino et al. 2004).
13   
To prevent excessive debt accumulation, both policymakers, while targeting 
unconstrained strategies, aim at controlling public debt.
 This assumption is 
meant to capture the shared preoccupation that a broadly balanced policy 
mix emerges from the decentralized decisions of the government and the 
central bank.
14  
                                                           
13 This interpretation differs from the one which has become standard in the literature, 
where it is assumed that policymakers’ objectives differ from the preferences of the 
representative agent and, for reasons usually not discussed, the policy assignment under 
consideration is assumed to deliver greater welfare than purely representative authorities 
(e.g. Bayer, 1999; and Beetsma et al., 2001). 
14 Tabellini (1987) justifies the inclusion of public debt in the policymakers loss function 
appealing to the fact that, in the absence of lump-sum taxes, a larger stock of public debt 
implies larger tax distortions in order to pay interest on the debt. Another reason for  
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Let m(t) be the creation of monetary base against liability of the Treasure at 
time t, which is under the control of the central bank; M be monetary policy 
unconstraint strategy, which reflects an inflation target, assumed constant 
over time; f(t) be fiscal deficit (net of interest payments) at time t, which is 
under the control of the government; F be fiscal policy unconstraint 
strategy, which reflects an output target, assumed constant over time; d(t) be 
the stock of nominal public debt outstanding at the beginning of period t. 
All variables have been divided by nominal income. 
The central bank chooses m(t) to minimize a quadratic loss function given 
by a weighted sum of the deviations of m(t) and d(t) from their targets (M 
and zero, respectively). The government chooses f(t) to minimize a 
quadratic loss function given by a weighted sum of the deviations of f(t) and 
d(t) from their targets (F and zero, respectively).
15 
The inter-temporal loss functions for the government and for the central 
bank are, respectively:
16 











⎡⎤ == − +
⎣⎦ ∫∫  











⎡⎤ == − +
⎣⎦ ∫∫  
where () G Lt and () V Lt  are the instantaneous losses of the government and 
central bank, respectively. The parameters α and β indicate the relative 
weight assigned to public debt by the two policymakers. If one of them did 
not care about public debt, it would set its control variable equal to its 
                                                                                                                                                    
including the level of public debt among the central bank’s objectives is offered by the 
fiscal theory of the price level. According to this theory, if fiscal policy does not ensure 
satisfaction of the government inter-temporal budget constraint, then the price level must 
do so and the central bank cannot control inflation (see Woodford, 2001 and literature cited 
therein). If doubts exist on the independence of the central bank, further reasons for 
including public debt among monetary policy targets are the preoccupation for an inflation 
bail-out, were the central bank forced to give way to government pressure for monetising 
the debt, or for an ex-post bail-out, in case of a financial crisis stemming from government 
defaulting on its debt.  
15 Notice that both policymakers care about public debt and the common target for it is 
zero. 
16 Notice that the central bank and the government have the same rate of time preference ρ 
(assumed to be constant over time) and the same time horizon, which is infinite.  
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target, irrespectively of the other policymaker’s actions. The more a 
policymaker cares about debt, the more it reacts to a variation of the 
opponent’s control variable and the more fiscal policy and monetary policy 
are interdependent.  
We do not explicitly consider society’s preferences. However, if the social 
loss function is a concave combination of the policymakers’ loss functions, 
any institutional arrangement that makes both policymakers better off with 
respect to a given one, represents a social welfare improvement. In the 
conclusions, we will exploit this hypothesis to discuss policy implication for 
institution design. 
Each policymaker minimizes its loss function subject to the government 
dynamic budget constraint, which can be written as: 
(3)  () () () () dt a dt ft mt =− + −   with  0 (0) dd =  
The parameter a, which is the difference between the growth rate of real 
income and the real interest rate, is assumed to be constant.
17 In order to 
eliminate explosive solutions and the problem of debt sustainability, we also 
assume that the growth rate of real income is larger than the real interest 
rate. In other words, since we are interested in the steady state values of the 
variables associated with different institutional setting, the assumptions 
regarding a simply isolate our objective from the effects of business cycle 
and debt sustainability, which are outside the scope of the present paper, 
notwithstanding their relevance.
18 
Notice that if policymakers did not care about debt (i.e. if α = 0 and β = 0), 







contrast, when policymakers take public debt into account, its steady state 
                                                           
17 The assumption that a is constant over time is introduced to limit the analytical 
complexity. An endogenous real interest rate would imply a non-linear dynamic constraint 
in the differential game. Similar assumptions are very common in the literature, see, among 
others, Tabellini (1986), Jensen (1994), van Aarle et al. (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg 
(1997), and Natale and Tirelli (2003). 
18 As suggested by Darby (1984), if the growth rate of real income is larger than the real 
interest rate, then, contrary to Sargent and Wallace (1981), the economy is not on an 
explosive path and the “arithmetic is not so unpleasant.” 
19 Without loss of generality, we only consider the case in which  M F > so that  0 > d . See 
Appendix A,  
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value is always lower than d  and it depends on the relative importance of 
debt in the policymakers’ preferences (i.e. α and β) as well as on the 
institutional regime (information setting) in which the policymakers interact. 
In fact, if both policymakers target public debt, each of them can try to free-
ride and leave onto the opponent the burden of reducing public debt, the 
more so when debt stabilization is costly in terms of instrumental variable 
adjustment and when a policymaker is able to pre-commit its policy. 
In the next section we solve the (differential) game under different regimes 
and in section 4 we evaluate and compare the outcomes. 
 
3. Monetary-Fiscal Interactions: equilibrium outcomes in 
different policy regimes 
3.1 Simultaneous moves (Nash equilibrium) 
Suppose that the central bank and the government, simultaneously, submit a 
plan of their future course of action and commit to carrying out this plan. 
The appropriate solution in this context is the so called open-loop Nash 
equilibrium, in which each player takes the current and future actions of the 
opponent as given. More precisely, a pair of strategies (one for each player) 
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium if, and only if, the time path of actions to 
which each player commits is an optimal response to the time path to which 
the opponent has committed.
20 
Each policymaker’s optimal plan of actions is obtained by minimizing its 
loss function subject to the government’s budget constraint. The Present 
Value Hamiltonians for the two policymakers can be written as: 





G tf t F d t a d t f t m t αλ ⎡⎤ Η= − −+ + − + − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
  





V tm t M d t a d t f t m t βλ ⎡⎤ Η= − −+ + − + − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
 
and corresponding first order conditions are (in each instant of time): 
                                                           
20 Notice that in our framework open-loop solutions are not time inconsistent since first 
order conditions involve neither rival control variables nor state variables (cf. equations (6) 
and (7)). See Dockner et al. (2000: Chapters 5 and 7) for an extended discussion.  
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(6)  () 1() 0 ft F t λ − −=  
(7)  () 2() 0 mt M t λ − +=  
(8)  () 11 1 () td t a λ ρλ α λ −= +    
(9)  () 22 2 () td t a λρ λ β λ −= +   
The adjoint equations (8) and (9) together with equation (3), after 
substituting equations (6) and (7), form a three differential equation system. 
The solution of this system with respect to the vector { } 12 () , () , () dt t t λλ   
gives the Nash open-loop equilibrium. Notice that, from equations (6) and 
(7), Lagrange multipliers correspond to the policymakers target deviation 
costs (i.e.  () 1() tf t F λ =−  and  ( ) 2() tM m t λ =− ). Hence, studying the 
dynamics of { } 12 () , () , () dt t t λλ   means studying the dynamics of 
policymakers deviations from their targets (recall that zero is their common 
debt target). 
Steady state equilibrium target deviations for the debt and controls are easily 
found:
21 





















where  0 a σ ρ =+>. Since our purpose is to compare the policymakers’ 
losses in different regimes, we prefer to express the results in terms of 
deviations from targets. Steady-state fiscal deficit can be directly computed 
from equations (11). Monetary instrument can be obtained in an analogous 
manner. 
                                                           
21 The solutions of all the regimes can be found by applying the algorithm provided by 
Appendix B, which can also be used for simulation purposes.  
  11
Equations (11) and (12) measure how much policymakers are active in 
fiscal consolidation with respect to their alternative objective. In other 
words, equation (11) measures how much the government restricts its 
expenditure in order to obtain a public debt lower than the level consistent 
with its fiscal target. Equation (12) has a similar interpretation.
22 
In the second stage of the game, it is assumed that policymakers minimize 
their inter-temporal losses so that only the eventual steady state level 
matters. This assumption is consistent with our focus on permanent effects 
of monetary-fiscal interaction. 
According to equilibrium outcomes and equations (1) and (2), steady state 
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Note that, if α β =  then  NN GV = ,  WW GV = ,  GV GV = , and  VG GV = , that is, 
the open-loop Nash solution gives equal payoff to symmetric players.  
3.2 Leadership 
Open-loop Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept when 
players take their decisions simultaneously. If one player can take its 
decisions knowing the opponent’s reaction, such a player becomes the 
leader; the other player, who reacts (rationally) to the leader’s decision, is 
the follower. In solving its optimization problem, the leader, knowing the 
follower’s reaction function, takes it into account as an additional constraint. 
The policy game can be solved with the government as leader and the 
central bank as follower (fiscal leadership regime) or vice versa.
23 
                                                           
22 Formally, this is due to the fact that, in all the regimes, deviations from instrumental 
variable targets equal the shadow prices of the fiscal debt for the policymakers (see 
equations (6) and (7)). 
23 “[...] a monetary authority sufficiently powerful vis-a-vis the fiscal authority that by the 
imposition of slower rates of growth of base money [...] it can successfully constrain fiscal 
policy by telling the fiscal authority how much seigniorage it can expect. [...] On the other  
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The solution with the government as leader and the central bank as follower 
is found by solving the government optimization problem: minimize (1) 
subject to (3) and the central bank’s first order condition and co-state 
constraint (equations (7) and (9)). Thus the government’s Hamiltonian has 
to be rewritten as follows: 





G t ft F dt dt t   αλ λ λ ⎡⎤ Η= − −+ + +
⎣⎦
 
First order conditions, obtained by maximizing (15), are given by equations 
(7) and (9) plus (16) and (17) below: 
(16)  () () ( ) ( ) 11 1 3 () tt d t a tt  λρ λ α λβ λ −=+− 
(17)  () 33 1 3 () () () ttt t  λρ λλ λ σ −= − − 
By solving the differential system of equations (3), (9), (16), and (17) and 
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hand, [...] the monetary authority is not in a position to influence the government’s deficit 
path but is limited simply to managing the debt that is implied by the deficit path chosen by 
the fiscal authority. Under this second scheme the monetary authority is much less powerful 
than under the first scheme” (Sargent and Wallace, 1981: 158).  
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Analogously, if the central bank leads and the government follows 
(monetary leadership), the solution is found by minimizing (2) subject to (3) 
and the government’s first order condition and co-state constraint (equations  
(6) and  (9)). Maximization of the Hamiltonian yields: 
(23)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 2 4 () tt d t a tt  λρ λ β λα λ −= +− 
(24)  () 44 2 4 () () () ttt t  λ ρλ λ λ σ −= − − 




































The losses associated with monetary leadership are: 























βα σ β σ
α σβ σ
⎡⎤ ++⎡ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ =− ⎢ ⎥
++ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 
3.3 The warfare regime 
A leadership equilibrium requires that the players have reached an 
agreement about who is going to lead the game and who is going to follow. 
If the players do not coordinate their actions, it may well be that each of 
them tries to act as leader. In this case the first order conditions for an 
optimum are given by equations (16), (17), (23), and (24) together with  
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equations (3), (6), and (7). The outcome associated with this equilibrium is 
the so called (Stackelberg) warfare. Steady state outcomes associated with 
the warfare regime turn out to be: 
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βα σ β βσ
αβ σ α β
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ++ +− ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ =−
⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤ ++ − ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
4. Evaluation of the outcomes 
In the game we have been describing both policymakers aim at stabilizing 
the debt, but each of them prefers that the other one takes the burden of 
doing so. In the Nash regime each policymaker takes as given the policy of 
the other. In this regime, steady state debt decreases in the relative weight 
assigned to this variable by the policymakers. Differently, in a leadership 
regime, the leader exploits the first-mover advantage to pre-commit to a low 
level of debt stabilization and to impose a greater responsibility towards this 
objective onto the other policymaker. In this regime, decreasing the weight 
that the follower attaches to the common goal of public debt stabilization 
reduces the leader’s incentive to place a bigger burden of the adjustment  
  15
onto the opponent. Therefore, the debt associated with leadership by the 
policymaker who cares relatively more about debt is lower than that 
associated with leadership by the other policymaker. A comparison of the 
warfare with the other regimes shows that steady state debt is higher under 
warfare than under any of the other regimes. In the warfare regime, in fact, 
each policymaker tries to shift the burden of debt stabilization onto the 
other, and for the same parameters’ values, each player puts less effort in 
debt stabilization. As a result of this free-riding policy, debt stabilization is 
reduced. Moreover, an increase in the relative importance of debt for one 
policymaker reduces its incentive to shift the debt burden on the opponent 
but it raises the other policymaker’s incentive to do so. Therefore, if the last 
effect prevails on the first, increased preferences for debt stabilization 
might, paradoxically, result in higher stocks of debt. Since the ex ante 
policymakers’ conjecture about the rival’s behaviour will never be realized 
ex post, the debt will always result higher than expected. The above 
discussion implies that a policymaker’s instrument is closer to its target the 
less the policymaker stabilizes the debt, either because it doesn’t care about 
debt or because being the leader, it can impose debt stabilization onto the 
opponent. In this respect, it can be verified that in a leadership regime, the 
leader’s (follower’s) control variable is closer to (more distant from) its 
target than it is under the Nash regime and that instrument’s deviations from 
target increase in the relative weight assigned to public debt by the 
policymakers. 
In order to evaluate the losses associated with each regime we also need do 
compare instruments’ deviation from target across outcomes. In general, the 
leader’s instrument deviation from its target is smaller than the follower’s. 
However, target deviations also depend on the other policymaker’s strategy: 
the deviation is smaller (higher) when the opponent plays follower (leader). 
Hence, the leader’s (follower’s) instrument, in a leadership regime, is the 
closest (farthest) from its target. Instruments’ deviations in the warfare and 
in the Nash regimes are in between those two extreme cases and lower in 
the warfare regime. The intuition for this ranking straightforwardly follows 
from our previous discussion on the policymakers’ incentive to free-ride in 
the different regimes.  
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We can summarize the above discussion as follows:
24 
1.  Debt in either of the Stackelberg regimes is higher than in the Nash 
regime but lower than in the warfare regime, i.e.  NV dd <  ( NG dd < ) 
and  VW dd <  ( GW dd < ). 
2.  If the central bank cares about public debt more than the government 
does (βα > ), then debt under fiscal leadership is higher than under 
monetary leadership ( GV dd > ) and vice versa for αβ > . 
3.  A policymaker’s instrument deviation from its target is at its 
minimum (maximum) value when the policymaker is leader 
(follower) and it is lower in the warfare regime than in the Nash one, 
i.e.  GW NV f fff ∆ <∆ <∆ <∆  and  VWNG mmmm ∆ <∆ <∆ <∆ . 
From observation 2 it follows that: 
a)  If a policymaker cares about debt relatively more than the opponent, 
then he rather be leader than follower. Note that the contrary is not 
necessarily true. 
 
From observations 1 and 3 it follows that: 
b)  For each policymaker, losses in the Nash regime are lower than 
those suffered when being follower, i.e.  NG VV <  and  NV GG < . 
Moreover, the leader’s losses are lower than those in the warfare 
regime, i.e.  VW VV <  and  GW GG < . 
In principle, it would be possible for a policymaker to prefer being the 
follower than the leader. This would be the case if the gains in terms of debt 
deviation were to compensate the losses in terms of instrument deviation. 
The above inequalities do not allow a unique ranking of losses. However, 
assuming that the policymakers have the same ordering of preferences the 
restrictions imposed by (b) above reduce the number of possible rankings so 
that only six of them are possible.
25 In the next section we analyze those 
                                                           
24 The following results can be easily verified with standard calculus. Proofs are however 
available upon request. 
25 The six rankings are obtained by combining the inequalities 
VW VV <  and 
NG VV < .  
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possibilities and conclude that one of them is the most interesting for the 
purpose of the present paper. 
 
5. Institutional Design 
In this section we solve the first stage of the game in which the institutional 
regime is chosen. At this stage, each policymaker can choose to be the 
leader ( l) or to follow the leader ( f) and the game payoffs are the 
equilibrium losses of the second stage. The matrix below represents the 
government’s and central bank’s losses under the regimes discussed in the 
previous sections. If the policymakers choose complementary roles, one of 
the leadership equilibria emerges. If both choose to lead, we have the 
warfare. By contrast, if both policymakers choose to play as followers, the 







f   l 
f   ( ) , NN VG   ( ) , GG VG  
l  ( ) , VV VG   ( ) , WW VG  
 
We concluded the previous section arguing that if the policymakers have the 
same ordering of preferences, then only six rankings of losses are possible. 
Of these rankings, four describe a game with a unique equilibrium, namely 
the Nash regime.
26 The other two describe a coordination game, i.e. a game 
with multiple equilibria. In these games, the players’ problem is to 
coordinate their decisions and reach one of the equilibria. A coordination 
game is with common interest if the equilibria are Pareto-rankable; in this 
case it is reasonable to expect that the policymakers coordinate and play the 
                                                           
26 These are, together with their homologues for G (recall that we have assumed the same 
ordering of the losses between the two policymakers): 1) 
NVGW VVVV <<<, 
2)
NGVW VVVV <<<, 3)
VWNG VVVV <<< , 4) 
VNG W VVVV <<<  
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Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
27 Coordination games without common interest 
are more problematic, since players prefer different equilibria. In our 
context, this possibility occurs under the ranking  VNG W VVVV < << and 
GNVW GGGG <<<. In this case both leadership regimes are equilibria of 
the game. However, each policymaker prefers a different solution (i.e. each 
policymakers prefers to be the leader). Henceforth, we focus on this ranking 
which generates a conflict for the choice of the institutional arrangement. 
In the context of monetary-fiscal interaction, the possibility of pre-play 
communication to reach an agreement appears to be a natural way to solve 
the conflict over the institutional arrangement.
28 In this case, it is possible 
for the players to reach the so-called correlated equilibrium. Unlike mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, in a correlated equilibrium the players can 
coordinate their randomization.
29 
If mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium were the solution of the first stage, there 
would be a positive probability for the warfare to be the outcome (see the 
table below which reports the probability of each outcome when the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium is played). 
Both players, instead, would prefer the warfare to have a zero probability of 
being the outcome. However, if the players randomize independently, there 
is no way in which this can be achieved. On the other hand, if the players 
could coordinate their randomization, the warfare would be excluded from 
the possible outcomes. 
 
                                                           
27 In our context the ranking 
NVWG VVVV < << (together with its homologous for G) 
describes a coordination game with common interest.  
28 Since binding agreements in a non-cooperative game are ruled out by definition, only 
self-enforcing agreements have to be considered. 








⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. In this equilibrium the central 
bank must be indifferent between leader and follower. This requires that the probability 
with which the government chooses to follow the leader, denoted by p, should be such that: 
(, ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( , )
NG VW Vf p V p V p V p V V l ⋅= + − = + − = ⋅ Analogously, the probability with which the 
central bank chooses to follow the leader, denoted by  p′ , should be such that:   
(, ) ( 1 )
NV Gf p G p G ′′ ⋅= + − =   (1 ) ( , )







f   l 
f   p p ′   ( ) 1 p p ′ −  
l  ( ) 1 p p′ −   ( )( ) 11 p p ′ − −  
 
 
Aumann (1974 and 1987) introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium, 
as an extension of Nash equilibrium, to allow for correlation between the 
players’ randomizations. A correlated strategy is a function f from a finite 
probability space into the space of actions (it is a random variable whose 
values are pairs of actions). As in the case of mixed strategies, the players 
base their choices on the observation of a random event but, unlike mixed 
strategies, with correlated strategies the observations are not independent. 
The easiest way to think of it is to suppose that there is an external referee 
who, after having observed the random event, suggests to each player which 
action he should take. If the players follow the suggestion, then the result is 
a correlated strategy. A correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy which 
is a best response against the equilibrium strategy of the opponent and 
therefore it is self-enforcing. The distribution of a correlated strategy is the 
function that assigns to each pair of players’ actions ( ) 12 , aa  the value 
() { }
1
12 , prob f a a
− . 







f   l 
f   12 q −   q  
l  q   0  
 
is the distribution of a correlated equilibrium for with  q q ≤  where, as 
shown below, q  depends on the equilibrium losses in the second stage.  
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Proof. Suppose that the central bank has been told to play f ; it then knows 








or  l (with probability 
q
q 1−
). By following the suggestion and playing f the 
central bank’s loss is 
(1 2 )  
(, )
1






. By playing l, instead, the 
central bank’s loss is 
(1 2 )  
(,)
1

















 the central bank is better off by following the 
















VG qq q ⎧⎫ = ⎨⎬
⎩⎭




≤ q  is required for 1 2q −  to be non-negative).■   
 
6. Conclusions 
The recognition that economic policy is not run by a unique policymaker 
and that different authorities take fiscal and monetary decisions makes the 
issue of how they coordinate their actions relevant. The outcome of 
monetary-fiscal interaction is determined by the rules of the game, i.e. the 
institutional regime in which the policymakers operate. Unlike most of the 
literature that studies monetary-fiscal interaction, our concern is not with 
short run macroeconomic stabilization; instead, we focus on the long run 
effects of institutional arrangements on public debt dynamics. 
In this paper the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies has been 
analyzed as a two-stage game played by the central bank and the 
government. In the first stage the institutional regime is established. This 
determines the rules of the game, i.e. the equilibrium solution to be applied  
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in the second stage, in which the policymakers minimize their loss functions 
subject to the government’s budget constraints. Since the policymakers have 
conflicting preferences over the institutional arrangement, the second stage 
presents a multiplicity of equilibria. Pre-play communication, to reach an 
agreement, allows to obtain the correlated equilibrium and to avoid the 
Pareto inferior outcome. In the correlated equilibrium monetary and fiscal 
leadership are both played. Under monetary leadership, the central bank is 
given first-mover advantage and it is not forced to “bail-out” fiscal 
decisions. Under fiscal leadership, the government is given first-mover 
advantage and the central bank is forced to monetize public debt and it 
cannot guarantee monetary stability. 
It has been recognized that the government will try to influence monetary 
policy even in circumstances in which monetary financing of public debt by 
the central bank is prohibited by statute.
30 We can therefore interpret our 
solution as describing an institutional setting in which either monetary or 
fiscal leadership emerge depending on whether the central bank is able or 
not to resist the government pressure. 
If the social loss function is a concave combination of the policymakers’ 
loss functions, the design of institutions which favours the exchange of 
information between policy-makers, yet preserving a clear allocation of 
responsibilities,
31 must be regarded as welfare improving. 
This matter is of some relevance for the EMU. In fact, the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue (also known as the Cologne Process) provides an institutional 
forum for discussing economic policy. This we plan to investigate in a 
future extension of our paper including more independent fiscal authorities 
and one common central bank. In addition, we aim to study different 
information setting as feedback and Markov solutions and more deeply their 
dynamics.   
 
Appendix A – Derivation of the Model: An Example 
As suggested by Tabellini (1986 applying a two-step procedure that 
separates the effects of monetary-fiscal interactions on public debt from 
those on output and inflation allows to greatly simplify the dynamics of the 
                                                           
30 See, e.g., the discussion in Dixit (2000). 
31 Which is of major importance to ensure accountability of individual policy-makers  
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model.
 The first step of the procedure consists of computing the optimal 
policies in the absence of public debt. These unconstrained strategies have 
to be modified to take into account the effects on public debt dynamics. The 
adoption of this procedure allows us to write down a model in which the 
policymakers’ loss functions are directly defined on the policy instruments 
and on the state variable (public debt). 
To derive the reduced-form model used in Section 2, we use, as an example, 
the well-known micro-founded model of Dixit and Lambertini (2003).   
However, the same reduced form can be derived from many different 
models describing the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities. 
Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003) framework can be summarised by four 
equations: 
(a1)  ()( )
22 1
2
ff f f Lx x qpp È˘ =- +- Í˙ Î˚
 
(a2)  ( ) ( )
22 1
2
mm m m Lx x qp p È˘ =- + - Î˚  
(a3)  ( )
e xg b ap p =+ - 
(a4)  0 cg pp =+ 
where  x yy =- is the real output gap, p  and  
e p  are inflation and 
expected inflation. Equations (a1) and (a2) describe the preferences of the 
fiscal and monetary authorities, respectively. Fiscal and monetary 
authorities set g  and  0 p . Equations (a3) and (a4) describe the real output 
gap and the inflation, which depends on policymakers’ choice (for more 
details see Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). 
By solving the game, we obtain the following reaction functions: 
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The Nash solution, assuming rational expectations, is: 
(a6)  ( ) ( )
()
* fm f f f f m
fm
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As compared with the model of Section 2,
* g  and 
*
0 p  correspond to F and 
M, respectively. They can be interpreted as the unconstrained policies that 
would be chosen by the policymakers if they did not care about public debt. 
By assuming an extreme assignment, in which the central bank is only 
concerned about inflation stabilization (i.e.  0 m q = ) and the government 
aims at stabilising output (i.e.  0 f q = ), we can parameterize the 













In equations (a6) and (a7),  if  m p  ( f x ) is sufficiently small (large), then 
F M > , which always holds if  0 m p =  and  0 f x >  (as it is often assumed). 
By contrast, the non-economically interesting case M F >  (negative debt 




Êˆ >+ Á˜ Ë¯
.    
It can be verified that equations (a6) and (a7) are independent of the regime. 





Appendix B – A Simple (MatLab) Algorithm to Compute Solutions 
 
% parameters 
alpha=0.5; beta=2; a=0.9; r=0.6; sigma=a+r; 
% foc matrices 
MN = [a  -1  -1; alpha sigma 0; beta 0 sigma]; 
MG = [a, -1, -1, 0; -alpha, -sigma, 0, beta; -beta, 0, -sigma, 0; 0, 1, 0, a]; 
MV = [a,- 1, -1, 0; -alpha, -sigma, 0, 0; -beta, 0, -sigma, alpha; 0,0,1,a]; 
MW = [a, -1, -1, 0, 0 ; -alpha, -sigma, 0, beta, 0; -beta, 0, -sigma, 0, alpha; 0, 1, 
0, a, 0; 0, 0, 1, 0, a]; 
% steady state solutions 
N = -inv(MN)*[1,0,0]'; 
G = -inv(MG)*[1,0,0,0]'; 
V = -inv(MV)*[1,0,0,0]'; 
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